. 1. Introduĉão histórica ao pensamento jurídico, épocas medieval e moderna --.

O sentido deste ensaio é o de pensar o sentido e o lugar da filosofia na época da globalização, mas por via de um recuo histórico, por forma a desafiar a visão dominante segundo a qual a globalização é um fenômeno atual. Para o efeito, procurarei abordar quatro questões: 1) Em que ambiente sociocultural, melhor, em que civilização, se dá a ruptura que conhecemos aqui por “primeira globalização”? 2) Que modo de consciência veio ela perturbar e alterar? 3) Que efeitos (...) teve sobre a filosofia tal perturbação? 4) Que tem o homem moderno e a filosofia atual a aprender com a resposta às três questões anteriores? (shrink)

Au début du deuxième livre des Seconds Analytiques ( APo. ), Aristote présente quatre types de recherche possible, qu’il distingue de la manière suivante : la recherche du que ; la recherche du pourquoi ; la recherche de si c’est ; et la recherche de ce que c’est. Le sens propre et les connexions mutuelles du premier, deuxième et quatrième types de recherche ne posent pas de grand problème, ayant par ailleurs été partiellement exposés dans d’autres contextes. Il en va (...) cependant autrement du troisième type de recherche. La pertinence de telles difficultés peut être saisie par la double lecture que permet la clause grecque ei estin (« si c’est ») qui s’y rapporte. Devons-nous la comprendre dans le sens de « si telle chose est (ou : si telle chose existe ) » (par exemple, « si le centaure existe ») ou dans le sens de « si ceci est tel » (par exemple, « si ceci est un centaure »)? Dans le but de répondre à cette question, nous adopterons le programme suivant : 1. En premier lieu, nous ferons une analyse aussi proche et détaillée que possible de APo. II 1-2, de manière à déterminer le sens qui doit y être donné à la clause ei estin (« si c’est »). 2. Nous chercherons ensuite à démontrer la conclusion à laquelle nous avons abouti en nous aidant des chapitres suivants des APo., chapitres dans lesquels la question est à nouveau explicitement et implicitement invoquée. 3. Enfin, nous analyserons les autres passages du corpus aristotélicien dans lesquels la critique a relevé de supposées « hypothèses d’existence », et ce, de manière à vérifier si ceux-ci sont susceptibles d’une lecture compatible avec celle qui aura été donnée de APo. II 1-2. Nous en conclurons que l’on ne retrouve aucune trace de préoccupations existentielles dans les passages qui ont fait l’objet de cette recherche ni, en général, dans les passages connexes du corpus aristotélicien. Ainsi, la lecture existentielle de la clause ei estin et des hypothèses scientifiques qui y sont liées sont plutôt le fruit d’une contamination moderne. (shrink)

La finalidad de este artículo es explicar, mediante algunos testimonios significativos, de qué manera penetra en España el aristotelismo y cómo esta penetración del nuevo pensamiento aristotélico en Europa pone de manifiesto un permanente conflicto entre Edad Media y Renacimiento, fundamentalmente en España, donde el redescubrimiento y uso de las autoridades antiguas constituye a menudo un importante problema teórico. El autor muestra alguna de estas dificultades en varios dominios (filosofía, ciencia, literatura).

O presente artigo aborda a ontologia de A. Sérgio, numa dupla vertente expositiva e crítica. Num primeiro momento enunciam-se os temas, o método e os critérios da abordagem, enquadrando a interpretação no próprio horizonte aberto pelo pensamento sergiano. Num segundo momento descobre-se a arquitectura do mundo tacitamente proposto pela sua gnosiologia e pela sua epistemologia idealistas, perspectivando-a como implícita "ontologia ideal". Num terceiro momento opera-se a análise crítica desta ontologia, segundo o duplo critério da consistência e da universalidade, retirando algumas (...) conclusões de âmbito genérico /// Le présente article aborde l'ontologie de A. Sérgio sous le double aspect d'exposition et de critique. En un premier moment on enoncerá le thème, la méthode et les critères de cette analyse, en insérant l'interprétation dans l'horizon même ouvert par la pensée de Sérgio. En un second moment, on découvre l'architectonique du monde tacitement proposé par sa gnoséologie et par son épistémologie idéalistes, en la montrant sous l'angle d'une ontologie "idéale" implicite. En un troisième moment, on passe a l'analyse critique de cette ontologie selon le double critère de la consistance et de l'universalité, pour tirer enfin quelques conclusions de caractère général /// This article begins with an indication of how the ontology of A. Sérgio may be approached. A description of its "ideal ontology" is then proposed on the basis of his idealist epistemology. Finally, a critical analysis of this ontology is attempted in order to evaluate its consistency and universality. (shrink)

Any analysis of the Hippocratic anthropology must begin by taking a stand on two quite different issues. On the one hand, it must ascertain a precise and definite meaning of the word ‘Hippocratic’ in such a context, considering the historical problems surrounding the 'real' Hippocrates and the doctrinal heterogeneity of the Hippocratic collection. On the other hand, it must justify the very possibility of an anthropology within the Hippocratic tradition, by accommodating it with the obvious animadversion that its most representative (...) works show towards any philosophical or speculative inquiry. The first problem can be solved by purely historical means, viz. by restricting the object of analysis to the texts that admittedly represent the views of the Hippocratic school. Not so with the second one, which constitutes the truesignificant problem from a philosophical point of view and with which the present article is therefore concerned. After discussing the texts where the question on the nature of man is posed, a general survey of the Hippocratic conception of the theoretical and scientific foundations of clinical practice is given, in order to understand the Statement according to which it is to medicine, and not to philosophy, that an answer to such a question truly belongs. From such a survey a thesis arises: that, according to the Hippocratic perspective, the appropriate answer to the question on the nature of man is not the one that seeks to determine what man is, even by means of the empirical methods of medicine, but the one that reshapes the question itself, thereby replacing the philosophical focus on the knowing of man, for the sake of knowledge, by the clinical focus on the caring of man, for the sake of man himself. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to offer a new overall interpretation of Heraclitus’ philosophy, through an analysis of his own implicit conception of ‘philosophy’, as it is insinuated in the few but important fragments where the word philia occurs. In these fragments, a clear distinction between reality and appearance is drawn for the first time in the history of philosophy; and, accordingly, philosophy itself is hinted at as a direct ‘attachment’ to reality, beyond the appearances that conceal it. Using this (...) result as a hermeneutic principle, a thorough survey of the most significant fragments is then proposed. The outcome of such a survey is, hopefully, the presentation of Heraclitus’ main doctrines as a coherent whole. (shrink)

Predication is a complex entity in Aristotelian thought. The aim of the present essay is to account for this complexity, making explicit the diverse forms it assumes. To this end, we tum to a crucial chapter of the Posterior Analytics, where, in the most complete and developed manner within the corpus, Aristotle proceeds to systematize this topic. From the analysis, it will become apparent that predication can assume, generically, five forms: 1) the predication of essence, that is of the genus (...) and the specific difference; 2) essential predication, that is either of the genus or of the differences ; 3) the predication of accidents per se 4) and of simple accidents ; and 5) accidental predication. However, only types 2-4 are forms of strict predication. In effect, the “predication” of essence is not a genuine predication, but a formula for identity, constituting, technically, the statement of the essence of the subject. On the other hand, accidental “predication” can only be conceived of as such equivocally, since it results from a linguistic accident through which the ontological subject of the attribution suffers a displacement to the syntactic position of the predicate, which is not, by nature, its own. In neither case does the phrase bring about any legitimate predication. The study concludes with a discussion of Aristotle’s thesis according to which no substance can be a predicate, which is implied by its notion of accidental predication, a thesis which has been - and in our opinion wrongly so - challenged in modem times. (shrink)

A edição das Obras Completas de Aristóteles em língua portuguesa que, por iniciativa do Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e com o apoio da Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia, começou a ser publicada pela editora portuguesa Imprensa Nacional – Casa da Moeda em 2004, arrancou de uma constatação: o número extremamente insuficiente de traduções dos escritos aristotélicos publicadas em Portugal até a esse momento (apenas seis, algumas das quais antigas, desactualizadas ou insatisfatórias: Categorias, Sobre a Alma, Política, (...) Retórica, Poética e Constituição dos Atenienses) e, em consequência, o fraco nível de interesse da comunidade filosófica portuguesa pelo autor e o muito deficitário grau de conhecimento, do público em geral, em relação à obra e ao pensamento deste grande filósofo. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

Over time, several authors have argued that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the principles of science in general. In this article, I will present four arguments against this view and propose a deflationary view of the role of dialectic in this regard. Accord ing to this view, such a role consists only in the defence of common principles against potential eristic attacks. Keywords: Science, dialectic, first principles, common principles, proper principles.

Este livro não é uma sebenta nem um manual, mas um instrumento de trabalho. Como tal, não foi concebido para ser lido nem estudado, mas sim para ser utilizado, à medida das necessidades e interesses do estudante ou do iniciado em Filosofia Antiga.

The aim of this article is to characterise the concept of difference in Aristotle, both as a predicate of the genus and as a predicate of the species. We then try to classify these two dimensions of difference within the framework of the predicables. The general conclusion is that the differentia constitutiva is an essential predicate, logically analogous to the genus in this respect, while the differentia divisiva cannot be located within that framework because the predicables are implicitly thought by (...) Aristotle as forms of predication in which the predicate has an extension greater than, or equal to, the subject. (shrink)